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1 Introduction
In the rush to meet Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) commitments to halve extreme poverty by
2015, ‘conditional cash transfers’ (CCTs) are being
widely adopted as one of the most effective means
of tackling poverty and social exclusion in developing
countries. In recent years, CCT programmes have
been established in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Jamaica, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, and many
more countries are piloting them with the support of
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donor
governments (de la Brière and Rawlings 2006).
Among the many claims made for CCTs is that, in
addition to providing effective relief from hardship,
they accomplish a number of social and human
development objectives, empowering beneficiary
household members through the dynamics built into
programme design. CCTs aim to promote subjective
and situational changes through which beneficiaries
become active, responsible citizens rather than
passive recipients of handouts. Women, as receivers
of the stipend and as those responsible for fulfilling
programme objectives, gain status and visibility
within the household and community, while their
children benefit from improved access to schooling
and health, expanded life chances and higher
expectations of what they can achieve. In all these
respects, CCTs promise a transformation of the lives
of the poor, brought about by the simple device of
providing a cash supplement conditional on children’s
school attendance and health monitoring.
CCTs offer governments a number of advantages over
previous poverty relief programmes. Cash transfers
boost local consumption without undercutting
producers’ prices as food programmes often do, and
once set up, they are relatively cheap and easy to
administer. Targeting is based on centralised data
systems, which allow for more accurate identification
of beneficiaries, regular monitoring and evaluations.
They also prevent multiple claiming by beneficiaries and
their centralised system helps curb local clientelism and
corruption; beneficiaries receive their stipends
conditional on compliance with programme objectives,
not, as is all too often the case, on the favour of
political bosses. Overall, their design reflects the broad
consensus in the development policy community that
poverty and deprivation must be tackled through
human development initiatives, and at source, in the
family. In order to overcome extreme poverty,
programmes must move from the old ‘assistentialist’
model to one that is at once more dynamic and more
comprehensive in its treatment of the poor.
PROGRESA/Oportunidades, established in Mexico in
1997 is one of the flagship CCTs that is attracting
international acclaim. Similar in many respects to
Bolsa Escola, pioneered by the Cardoso government
in Brazil, PROGRESA/Oportunidades has four
defining characteristics: (1) it is targeted at
populations in extreme poverty; (2) its aim is to
promote human development, focusing on the
health, education and nutrition of children; (3)
support is conditional in order to ensure compliance
with programme objectives and to bring about
positive changes in beneficiary behaviour; and (4) it
delivers a cash transfer directly to women, in the
form of grants to pay for the costs associated with
their children’s schooling.
Evaluations of Oportunidades1 show that it is
successful in meeting its principal objectives. It
reduces poverty through supporting household and
food expenditure, with a corresponding decline in
the malnutrition of young children; it achieves higher
enrolments for those of school age, reduced
dropout rates and a lower incidence of child labour.
These results have led to the programme greatly
extending its coverage. Oportunidades was initially a
rural programme but has doubled its beneficiary
population to 5 million, to include urban households;
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is set to reach at least 11 million
under the second Lula administration.
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Such positive outcomes in children’s welfare are
welcome, especially when poverty, deprivation and
exclusion are the reality for up to 40 per cent of the
population in regions such as Latin America. Yet
there are reasons to be cautious over some of the
more overblown claims made on behalf of CCTs.
Concerns have been voiced over whether their
successes so far can be duplicated in poorer
countries. CCTs were developed in, and have been
most successful in middle-income countries that have
institutional and administrative capacity. Whether
poorer states would be able to meet the increased
demand for social services generated by these
programmes is less certain. Other worries centre on
whether the stipend offered to qualifying households
is adequate to meet their needs, and in particular
whether it is sufficient to protect against shocks such
as the unemployment of the main breadwinner,
illness and environmental hazards. These programmes
also do not generally reach vulnerable groups such as
the disabled and the elderly, or those living beyond
the reach of school and health centres, who cannot
therefore comply with the programme’s conditions
(de la Brière and Rawlings 2006).
2 The gender dimension
CCTs are commonly praised for their gender
awareness, in particular for empowering women as
recipients of the cash transfer, itself undoubtedly an
advance on previous practice. In addition,
PROGRESA/Oportunidades has, as one of its main
aims: ‘strengthening the capabilities of beneficiary
family members’. As a result of adopting a ‘gender
perspective’, it ‘promote(s) the equal access of
women to its benefits’, recognising that ‘poverty
acquires different forms according to the inequalities
that prevail between the sexes’ (SEDESOL 2005).
But how far are these aims realised? And what are
the outcomes and gender impacts of CCTs?
CCTs are principally designed to enhance children’s
life chances. They are targeted programmes not only
in the usual sense of selecting out beneficiaries from
the population at large, but they are targeted at the
micro level, within the family or household itself. The
social construction of need is therefore selective and
child-centred; in this order of priorities, women are
positioned to serve the needs of the children
through the programme. This places talk of
‘empowerment’ in question, since such benefits as
the women derive from participating in the
programme are largely the result of servicing the
needs of others. In this model, fathers/husbands are
marginal to the workings of the programme, which
in effect equates to being marginalised from the care
of children.
There are good reasons for focusing scarce resources
on children – this is not at issue here. The question is
whether, in depending upon and reinforcing a
maternal model of care, these programmes may be
responsible for sub-optimal outcomes for some
household members, particularly for the stipendiary-
holding mothers, in the medium and long term. Anti-
poverty policies clearly make more sense if, in
targeting one group in need, they take care not to
disadvantage another vulnerable group in the process.
If we focus on the situation of women, we find that
while there is some discussion of the gender effects
of these programmes in some evaluations,2 this issue
has received little critical attention in the public
policy debate. CCTs give mothers a central role in
their design; as stipendiaries, they are responsible for
fulfilling the demands of the programme through a
quasi-contractual arrangement. Sometimes defined
as co-responsibility, conditionality is understood in
terms of cost-sharing, where beneficiaries make a
contribution (in time and labour) to the programmes
(Yaschine 1999).3 Receipt of the stipend is in this case
conditional on fulfilling the duties laid out by the
programme managers: this involves taking children
for regular health checks; meeting targets for
ensuring their children’s attendance at school;
attending workshops on health and programme co-
ordinators meetings; and contributing a set amount
of hours of work to the community, typically for
cleaning buildings or clearing rubbish. Failure to
comply with these requirements can lead to fines or
even being struck off the programme.
Oportunidades claims that it has helped to ‘empower’
the mothers and daughters who are its beneficiaries.
But is this really the case? As far as daughters are
concerned, the answer is a qualified affirmative:
improving the educational opportunities of girls is
known to have strong potential to enhance their self-
esteem and life chances, while at the same time
sending a message to households and to communities
that girls are ‘worth investing in’. Results from
different regions confirm that this is a general and
positive outcome. The situation regarding their
mothers is less clear: stipends paid directly to women
are widely accepted to benefit their households
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through more equitable redistribution, and in giving
them direct control over cash resources, their
standing in their communities as well as their leverage
within the household can also be enhanced. Women
in these programmes generally confirm that their
self-esteem and financial security are enhanced as a
result of the stipends; they also feel that they acquire
more status in their neighbourhoods, with
shopkeepers treating them with more respect as they
became creditworthy (Escobar Latapí and González
de la Rocha 2004; Adato et al. 2000).
However, further evidence on the gender impacts of
the programme is needed to establish if it is
empowering women through increasing their
economic autonomy and is producing any
redistribution of power and status within households.
Here, some of the assumptions in the literature on
CCTs are questionable. For instance, cash handouts
paid directly to women may have the positive effects
in terms of status that are claimed, but they do not
necessarily alter male/female inequities in personal
consumption and they can even serve to protect
men’s personal income and expenditure (Chant
2007). They can also generate tensions between men
and women at household and community levels,
whether around the implications of women’s
increased autonomy and presence in the public
sphere, men’s resentment at being displaced as
providers, or their envy of what they see as women’s
privileged access to project resources.4 Moreover, as
Chant notes, women might acquire more control
over household management but they also acquire
more responsibility for managing poverty. What are
the implications then for gender relations? Some
evidence suggests that cash transfers might be
encouraging some men to do less income-
generating work (Rubio 2002; Escobar Latapí and
González de la Rocha 2004).5 If this is the case, it
squares with Chant’s (2007) findings that the more
women work in the paid economy, the less men are
inclined to. The only safe conclusion that can be
drawn on the matter of whether stipends empower
women on not, is that we do not know, in the
absence of reliable data on this question.
Likewise, few evaluations have so far explored, in any
depth, if the demands of these programmes have any
negative effects on female participants. One evaluation
carried out by a network of promotoras found that
some stipendiaries felt ‘discriminated against’ by its
demands on their time, particularly for work such as
cleaning and sweeping. They believed that they were
‘treated badly or … were asked to do things in ways
that offended their dignity’ (Rivero 2002: 4).6
There was, not surprisingly, resistance among some
communities to accepting the notion of ‘co-
responsibility’. Rather, the requirements of the
programme were seen in terms of ‘obligations’ and
participants felt that genuine co-responsibility would
also (for instance) oblige teachers to accept their
responsibility not to miss classes. This ‘inequality of
responsibility’ made some participants resentful of
the way they were expected to meet targets set for
monitoring the health and education of their
children. Why, they asked, should a teacher’s salary
not be reduced if they fail to turn up to teach, since
mothers were fined for not meeting their targets
(Rivero 2002)?7 This latter point reflected a general
criticism that there were few reliable mechanisms of
accountability where complaints regarding the
behaviour of officials or professionals could be
processed. Nor were the participants given an active
role in the design, management and evaluation of
the programme. It is hard to square these findings
with the view that the programme was intended to
function ‘as a way of exercising civil, political and
social rights and as a means to achieve full
citizenship’ (Rivero 2002).
Some evaluations have also raised the problem that
the time and labour demands on beneficiaries
conflict with women’s other income-generating
activities (Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha
2004; Adato et al. 2000; Armas 2005 and Espinosa
2006) This was particularly the case with the unpaid
voluntary workers (promotoras) who dedicated on
average 30 hours a month to administrative, pastoral
and medical responsibilities. Adato et al. (2000)
among others, found that women’s workloads
increased as children’s contribution to domestic tasks
decreased in favour of school demands; and where
help was available it was still generally daughters
who were helping their mothers rather than sons,
with the girls still dropping out of school earlier than
the boys. Altering girls’ expectations does not just
depend on schooling but on what role models are
available within the family.8
3 Women are vulnerable too
As decades of research testify, gender divisions are
associated with inequalities of power and resources.
They work to women’s disadvantage if they
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undermine their autonomy and economic security,
thereby deepening their vulnerability as they
strengthen their dependence on marriage and family
for their security. It is important to stress that the
‘empowerment’ that women are supposed to achieve
as stipendiary-holders is not the empowerment of
greater autonomy or security, since their participation
in the programme in effect binds them ever more
closely to the household and undermines their
capacity for autonomous action, particularly economic
action. Receipt of the transfers in effect reinforces
their traditional roles and responsibilities, so that
women are empowered only within these structures,
which are ones through which disempowering
gender asymmetries are reproduced.
Most women in these programmes are extremely
disadvantaged; they may suffer from multiple forms
of exclusion, most will have low literacy levels, and
their skills are poorly rewarded. Many will be involved
in some form of income-generating activity and even
if their earnings are meagre, they nonetheless
represent a significant, possibly increasing proportion
of household income. Where male out-migration is
occurring, many women manage households with
several children, along with responsibility for other
kin including elderly dependants, yet no child-care
facilities are offered to beneficiaries to help them
meet the obligations imposed by the programme.
What do CCT programmes offer to these women
beyond their status as stipendiaries and the more
certain satisfaction of providing for their children? In
most programmes there is little in their design that
advances women’s economic autonomy or security.
Indeed, the costs many bear through juggling their
multiple responsibilities in terms of weak labour
market links, lack of support for care work and long-
term insecurity are not taken into account. Training
for the job market is limited or non-existent, and
there is scant if any child-care provision for those
women who need it because they work, train or
study. This is not to deny that many women might
not perceive the programme’s demands as anything
other than helpful in relieving some of the pressure
on them to obtain paid work – especially if little is
available to them. But given the importance of
women’s lifelong economic precariousness, the lack
of attention to this issue is striking.
The underlying problem with CCTs, then, is that they
not only depend on gender divisions for their
functioning but in some ways they actively reinforce
them. The transfers bind women to the household as
carers, conditional on maternal responsibility for
children’s care and welfare, that is, on good
motherhood. There are naturally no conditionalities
imposed on fathers, who by circumstance and
design, are marginalised from the programme and
from child-care responsibilities. This reinforcement
proceeds in striking disregard of the internationally
promoted consensus on women’s and children’s
rights and on gender relations within the family. The
Children’s Rights Convention sums up a widely-held
view that children should be cared for by both
parents, and child welfare – particularly that of boys
– is now understood to be enhanced by fathers’
involvement in caring. Is the programme’s support
for maternalist models of care in ‘the best interest of
the child’ or of women, or indeed, even of fathers?
4 Concluding observations
The international consensus that children should be
prioritised in social programmes implies that child-
focused anti-poverty strategies will continue to
achieve wide support, and for good reasons. It is
therefore urgent and necessary to pose some tough
questions about some of the claims that are being
made for current programmes. With regard to their
selective approach to need, a critical issue is to
consider how to rectify the trade-off that is
occurring between women’s and children’s needs,
first by tackling rather than reinforcing women’s
vulnerability, and second, by changing the pattern of
intra-household responsibilities for care. As far as the
first of these propositions is concerned, children’s
needs for good care and for access to health and
education do not have to prevent their mothers
from escaping poverty and deprivation. Women in
extreme poverty need to be able to combine their
child-care responsibilities with their own exit
strategies out of poverty. They need projects that
enhance their capabilities through education or
training, and provide access to employment and
credit for income-generating projects that can
enable them to acquire their own assets. Above all,
they need sustainable material security rather than
depending on a subsidy that is conditional on good
motherhood and the number of school-age children
they care for.
This implies that when assessing the social impact of
these programmes, it is important to consider the
household as a whole (and by extension, its gender
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order) if they are to maximise their positive impacts.
There is no reason why their design could not
encourage a more dynamic model of gender and
generational cooperation, one which would
generate more positive outcomes for all members,
including men. This would depend upon attitudes
towards men changing so that fathers are considered
as having something positive to contribute to the
work of care, involving them in ways that break
down dysfunctional sex typing and power relations
across the generations. Households could be
encouraged to adopt more cooperative principles in
regard to care rather than relying on the exclusive
responsibilities of mothers.
Finally, if such programmes are to offer more to
their beneficiaries than they do at present and
enhance the life chances of seriously disadvantaged
populations, they need to be linked to efforts to
generate sustainable livelihoods within the regions
where they are put in place. If poverty is the result of
a lack of jobs combined with precarious livelihoods,
tackling poverty through a stipend is no substitute for
an integrated approach to poverty relief. Indeed, a
perverse outcome of the Oportunidades programme
is that in depressed rural regions, grant-holding
school-leavers see no future in remaining in Mexico,
and talk of departing for the USA as soon as they
can. Without attention to livelihoods, CCTs will be
educating young people principally for export – to
the lower rungs of the metropolitan labour markets.
Meanwhile, the future of their less mobile mothers
shifts from dependency on a stipend for
motherhood, to dependency on remittances from
husbands and children – yet neither is a secure or
sustainable prospect.
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Notes
* This article draws on research undertaken for
Molyneux 2006.
1 See, inter alia, Adato et al. 2000; Skoufias 2005;
Skoufias and Di Maro 2006; Escobar Latapí and
González de la Rocha 2004. See the SEDESOL
website, and for evaluations posted on the
Oportunidades website: www.Oportunidades.gob.mx
2 There is still a paucity of appropriately detailed
evidence to settle the question of gender impacts.
For studies which discuss the gender impacts of
the Oportunidades programme, see inter alia, Adato
et al. 2000; Escobar Latapí and González de la
Rocha 2004; and Espinosa 2006. See Armas
(2005) for a gender critique of a sister programme
in Ecuador, Bono de Desarrollo Humano.
3 According to Programme Director, Rogelio
Hermosillo, the majority of Latin American
countries had by Summer 2005, sought advice on
how to set up similar programmes.
4 Adato et al. (2000) state that women did
complain that men were left out of the health
workshops, and I observed similar attitudes during
my 2005 field visits.
5 Chant (2007) in her comparative research has
arrived at similar conclusions regarding men’s
withdrawal of financial responsibility from the
family when women’s income rises. Armas (2005)
has similar findings for Ecuador’s CTP. More
research on this issue in relation to Oportunidades
would be necessary to establish whether this was
a trend. Skoufias and Di Maro (2006), on pre-
2000 data, found that the programme did not
have a large impact on adult participation in the
labour market. This needs updating with time-
series data; the impact on time allocation also
needs more research – this study only analysed
1999 data.
6 In the PROGRESA programme, such work
involved on average 29 hours per month.
7 More generally, as an IFPRI evaluation notes, ‘If
the programme is to have a significant effect on
the human development of children, more
attention needs to be directed to the quality of
education provided by schools’ (Skoufias 2005: 2).
8 Many poor rural women engage in cultivation and
have traditionally relied on help from children in
this work. Clearly, this is another area where
more research is needed on the socioeconomic
impact on children’s withdrawal from these
activities.
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